CHANGE AND FIRM VALUATION IN U.S. FOOD RETAILING AND MANUFACTURING by Kaufman, Phillip R. & Bjornson, Bruce
14   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
Change and Firm Valuation in U.S. Food Retailing and 
Manufacturing
Bruce Bjornson and Phillip R. Kaufman
The competitive environment in the agri-food sector is evolving as the food manufacturing and retailing industries 
become more concentrated. Evolving industry structure and new ﬁrm investment portend changes in future ﬁrm com-
petitiveness and performance. This research describes how large food-manufacturing and retail ﬁrm performance has 
shifted and how ﬁrm valuation signals expected future change in performance. While there have been expectations 
that return on investment of large food retailers would increase relative to large packaged-food manufacturers, we ﬁnd 
that this has not yet happened and that market valuations imply that retailers are not likely to gain on manufacturers 
in the future.
Consolidation and structural change garner consid-
erable media attention and raise policy concerns 
about market structure and its implications for con-
sumers and producers (Kaufman 2000b, 2000a). 
In response, ﬁrms stress potential efﬁciencies and 
heightened competitive forces as a motivation for 
consolidation (Kaufman 2000b). For example, 
continued expansion of Wal-Mart in the retail gro-
cery business has increased expected competitive 
pressure on established grocery retailers (Hamstra 
2002). The Wal-Mart model of large-scale pro-
curement and use of supply-chain-management 
practices has likely increased buying efﬁciencies 
and bargaining power vis-à-vis agricultural and 
grocery suppliers.
Major organizational changes taking place within 
the industry may not have had their full impact on 
ﬁrm performance, however. These developments 
could lead to improvements in future ﬁrm competi-
tiveness and performance over performance to date.   
We estimate the impact of these changes on future 
investment opportunities and expected performance 
according to how competing ﬁrms are valued. Es-
timating expected performance from market valu-
ations is based on the efﬁcient-markets hypothesis 
whereby capital markets effectively incorporate 
information about expected future performance 
into ﬁrm valuations. Value is the central ﬁnancial 
incentive both for investors that allocate capital 
among ﬁrms, and for ﬁrm managers that employ 
capital. Firm managers compete to attract inves-
tors’ capital by strategically or opportunistically 
investing to improve competitiveness and ﬁnancial 
performance. As ﬁrms improve performance and 
grow, they enhance their capacity to pay dividends 
to investors, increase market value, and therefore 
increase investor returns and the attraction of new 
investment capital. Firms’ expected future proﬁt-
ability as reﬂected in market values can inform us of 
expected changes in proﬁtability relative to historic 
norms and of what may result from a changing busi-
ness environment.
This study measures how the expected future 
performance of large food retailers and manufac-
turers, as reﬂected in market values, is expected 
to change relative to measured performance over 
recent years. In the early 1990s there was a belief 
that large packaged-food manufacturing ﬁrms’ pric-
ing power with high-margin brand products was 
weakening and that retailers would start to gain 
bargaining power with their packaged-food manu-
facturer-suppliers (Weston and Chiu 1996). Retailers 
were also expected to gain power in market channels 
from consumer information gleaned from scanner 
data on retail purchases and by becoming larger 
through consolidation (Kinsey 2000). Although the 
ﬁnancial performance of major public U.S. food 
retailers has not yet improved relative to major 
packaged-food manufacturers, it is possible that 
the acceleration in retail consolidation or advances 
in information technology and productivity have 
not yet had their full effect. We hypothesize that 
future retail proﬁtability will improve relative to 
those of manufacturers. Our approach is to examine 
expected ﬁrm performance by analyzing capital-
market valuations of publicly traded major food 
manufacturers and retailers. In this manner we can 
test hypotheses concerning the impact of recent de-
velopments on future performance. The tests will 
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not reveal whether changes in retail ﬁrms cause 
changes in manufacturer proﬁtability, however. It 
is possible that retailer proﬁtability could improve 
other than at the expense of manufacturers, and 
that both retailer and manufacturer proﬁtability 
could change in the same direction. We instead 
test whether hypothesized changes are occurring, 
thereby informing the overall debate.
Firm Performance and Value
Firm value reveals the collective market evaluation 
of a ﬁrm’s competitiveness and future proﬁtability. 
Proﬁtability is derived from a ﬁrm’s distinct capa-
bilities such as marketing expertise and effective 
use of brand names, efﬁcient production means, 
technology, research and development capability, 
and managerial skill. Distinct capabilities derived 
from organizational, knowledge-based assets are 
intangible, but valuable for their power to gener-
ate proﬁts and growth. Such organizational assets 
constitute intangible capital: organizational value in 
excess of the value of short-term and ﬁxed assets. 
While tangible capital can generally be dupli-
cated across ﬁrms, intangible capital distinguishes 
a ﬁrm’s competitive nature. Shifts in societal de-
mands can draw on different intangible assets and 
shift valuations of a ﬁrm’s intangible capital, such 
as the value of a brand name.  A ﬁrm’s competitive 
position may also change in relation to shifts in the 
business environment, typically sooner than ﬁrms 
change their internal operations, strategy, or actual 
performance. This results in the market revaluing 
a ﬁrm sooner than the ﬁrm can institute internal 
change that adjusts to the changed environment. 
Furthermore, many factors that underlie ﬁrm com-
petitiveness, such as management quality, are tacit 
and cannot be measured (Jacobson 1992; Nelson 
1995; Waring 1996; Jacobson and Hansen 1997). 
Even though competitive factors important to suc-
cess are often tacit, capital markets generally are 
aware of them and value them accordingly.
Firm Performance
We assess ﬁrm proﬁtability performance by mea-
suring return on investment (ROI). Return on in-
vestment is a comprehensive measure of real ﬁrm 
performance that accounts for all costs including 
strategic and managerial resources, marketing, and 
overhead not allocated to ﬁrm business segment 
markets. In contrast, an economic rate of return 
relates an investment to all of its discounted cash 
ﬂows over the life of the investment. It is not pos-
sible to measure a ﬁrm’s  economic rate of return 
over regular historical intervals because at any given 
time a ﬁrm is a composite of multiple investments at 
varying stages (Fisher and McGowan 1983). Thus 
economic rate of return can only be measured at the 
completion of an investment project (or termina-
tion of a ﬁrm). We must instead measure historical 
return on investment over sequential intervals as 
periodic signals of economic rate of return and the 
most useful measure of business performance (Ja-
cobson 1987; Fama and French 2000a). Return on 
investment is therefore a tractable, periodic measure 
rather than a pure economic rate of return. We esti-
mate average expected future return on investment 
and evaluate how it is expected to change from past 
performance.
Return on investment (ROI) is the most stable 
and comprehensive ﬁrm-proﬁtability gauge, and 
single most important driver of ﬁrm value (Fama 
and French 2000a; Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 
2000, p. 157; Cottle, Murray, and Block 1988, p. 
160). ROI measures the ratio of operating proﬁts 
to invested capital (e.g., Brealey and Meyers 2000, 
p. 834):
ROI = 
   Net operating proﬁt
       Beginning invested capital
A ﬁrm’s invested capital represents its accumulated 
depreciated investments in tangible assets, includ-
ing working capital, ﬁxed assets, and other tangible 
assets employed in the ﬁrm’s operations to generate 
sales and operating proﬁts. Because it cannot be 
measured directly, a ﬁrm’s greater intangible capital 
(excluded from the denominator) that generates op-
erating proﬁts will thus be reﬂected in higher ROI. 
Return on investment depends on accounting as-
sumptions of ﬁxed-asset depreciation and inﬂation. 
Returns also depend on the lumpiness of ﬁxed-asset 
investments and on the “time shape” of cash inﬂows 
generated by the investments (Fisher and McGowan 
1983). For example, an enterprise may have higher 
undepreciated invested capital balances or yield 
lower beneﬁts in the early, less-proﬁtable stage of 
an investment, and yield higher returns in the later 
stage. Accounting rates of return to the ﬁrm repre-
sent weighted-average returns for all its individual 
investments across its business segments and across 16   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
segment investments at varying stages of maturity. 
For the purpose of this study, ﬁrm-level aggregation 
of accounting information across multiple invest-
ments tends to mitigate lumpiness of investment 
and the time shape of the corresponding beneﬁts. 
This research focuses on expected change in ROI, 
so the impact of measurement errors will be limited 
to changes in accounting deviations from the true 
economic representation from year to year. 
Valuation Model: Expected Future Performance
We use a ﬁrm-valuation analysis to estimate ex-
pected future return on investment and growth. 
Our analysis is founded on the widely accepted 
hypothesis that U.S. capital markets are efﬁcient at 
incorporating relevant information and knowledge 
into performance expectations and valuations. In 
this analysis, efﬁciency implies that equity markets 
are “minimally rational” in that prices are unbiased, 
and forward-looking stock market investors cannot 
rationally expect extra-normal returns (Rubinstein 
2001). The study does not rely on the hypothesis 
that markets are maximally rational in accurately 
incorporating all information into asset valuations, 
but instead that markets are efﬁcient enough that 
there are no expected extra-normal returns to in-
vestors. Stock market efﬁciency is the prevailing 
theory primarily because there is no comprehensive 
alternative that better accounts for the wide range of 
observed market-price behavior (Fama 1997). 
Because efﬁcient markets result in unbiased 
valuations, our approach is to rely on the valua-
tions as crucial information about expected future 
ﬁrm performance. In order to develop the link be-
tween expected future performance and value, we 
apply a general discounted-cash-ﬂow model from 
investment theory. In the optimization problem for 
ﬁrm i, management makes strategic investment and 
operating decisions to maximize the present value 
of expected future cash ﬂows:
            CFis+1 (Kis Iis+1)





        (1+ri)s+1-t
         ﴿
    subject to:  Kis − Kis-1 = I is − Depr is(K is-1),
where CFis+1 = net free cash ﬂows from operations, 
or net operating proﬁt less investment cash ﬂows, 
i.e., [Net operating proﬁtis+1 − Ii s+1]; investment capi-
tal Ii s+1 is a function of beginning invested capital 
Kis and concurrent investment; Et is the operator for 
expectations at the end of period t; Net operating 
proﬁtis+1 is net of taxes and before after-tax interest 
expense that the ﬁrm generates from its beginning 
invested capital; ri is the weighted-average cost of 
capital (discount rate); and Depris(Kis-1) is deprecia-
tion expense on ﬁxed assets.
  An equivalent operational representation is the 
residual income model (Lee 1999) that speciﬁes 
ﬁrm value as the accounting value of beginning 
invested capital plus the present value of expected 
future residual income:





           (1+ri)s+1-t
           ﴿
where ROIis+1 = (Net operating proﬁtis+1)/Kis. Thus, 
[ROIis+1 − ri ]×Kis represents residual income which 
is analogous to economic proﬁts in excess of nor-
mal competitive proﬁts. Residual-income models 
are consistent with operational models such as 
the McKinsey Economic Proﬁt Model (Copeland, 
Koller, and Murrin 2000) or the Economic Value 
Added (EVA) model prominently deployed by 
Stern Stewart and Company (Stewart 1990). Re-
sidual-income models incorporate ROI, so their 
economic interpretation is consistent with histori-
cal ROI performance analysis. Reﬂecting market 
expectations, these are the most theoretically rigor-
ous valuation models (Lee 1999). Average expected 
ROI is estimated using the procedures outlined be-
low and in the Appendix and how it is expected to 
differ from past ROI is evaluated. Such valuations 
may be sensitive to model assumptions, however. 
To address this concern, we compare each industry’s 
average difference of expected performance from 
its historic average so that only differences in valu-
ation sensitivities across the two industries would 
have an impact. We also address model sensitivity 
by applying standard valuation procedures based 
on data generated through generally accepted ac-
counting procedures (GAAP) and widely observed 
consensus growth estimates.
Sample
We use a sample of large publicly traded ﬁrms 
in food retailing and manufacturing. To achieve 
this, we draw primarily on the S&P 500 index 
portfolio, a widely followed benchmark for money 
managers, pension sponsors, and others. To be in-
cluded in the S&P 500, ﬁrms must represent lead-
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public ﬂoat equal to at least 40% of the ﬁrm’s total 
outstanding shares (public ﬂoat refers to shares 
freely traded that help ensure active trading and 
more-efﬁcient market valuations than would ex-
ist with shares closely held by insiders and thinly 
traded), and must be headquartered be in the U.S. 
(Standard and Poor’s 2001).1 
  The S&P 500 portfolio classiﬁes ﬁrms by the 
Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (Standard 
and Poor’s 2001). We use the 14 U.S. S&P 500 
ﬁrms in the packaged-food- and beverage-manufac-
turer industries from the beginning of 2001: Heinz, 
ConAgra, General Mills, Sara Lee Corp., Campbell 
Soup, Hershey Foods, Kellogg Company, and Wil-
liam Wrigley Jr. (packaged-food-industry ﬁrms); 
Anheuser-Busch Companies and Adolph Coors 
(brewers); Brown-Forman (distillers and vintners); 
and Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola Enterprises, 
and PepsiCo (soft drinks). 
There are six major retail food ﬁrms in our sam-
ple, consisting of the six largest U.S. public grocery 
retailers (Kaufman 2000c). Among top retailers, we 
excluded Wal-Mart Stores—which is not primarily 
a grocery retailer—and two foreign ﬁrms, Royal 
Ahold N.V. (Dutch) and Delhaize Group (Belgian). 
The six retailers in our sample include all four ﬁrms 
in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 retail food in-
dustry: Albertson’s Inc., Kroger Company, Safeway 
Inc., and Winn Dixie (Standard and Poor’s 2001). 
The sample also includes Supervalu Inc.—which is 
classiﬁed in the S&P 500 food-distribution industry 
but has both retail stores and food distribution—and 
Great Atlantic and Paciﬁc Tea Company from the 
retail food industry of the S&P Small-Cap 600 
portfolio.2 
Data and Performance Measures
Financial accounting measures yield the best pe-
riod-by-period measure of current return on real in-
vestment, and are the underpinning of ﬁrm ﬁnancial 
analyses. These measures are derived from ﬁrm ac-
counting-information systems, the source of ﬁnancial 
and ﬁrm-level managerial-performance information. 
We use source accounting-performance data from 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Forms 
10-K and related reports ﬁled by the respective ﬁrms 
for our return-on-investment analyses. SEC ﬁlings 
are rich in information, as they also have signiﬁcant 
qualitative information on performance that we in-
corporate into our interpretation of the analyses.
Fundamental accounting data and published 
analysts’ expectations efﬁciently summarize ac-
cumulated market information and are principal 
sources of capital-market efﬁciency. We use market 
valuations, historic ROI analyses, and published 
consensus of securities analysts’ expectations for   
revenue growth in order to estimate expected future 
ROI performance and growth. First, we estimate 
expected return on investment for the ﬁrst ﬁve years 
through fundamental accounting-forecast models 
(Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Lev and Thiagara-
jan 1993). We estimate the ﬁrst two years’ revenue 
growth from professional securities analysts’ con-
sensus expectations about growth that are forecast 
up to ﬁve years. Analysts’ revenue forecasts tend to 
be more accurate than earnings forecasts (Damoda-
ran 2002; Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok 2003). 
However, revenue forecasts also tend to be some-
what optimistic (Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok 
2003). We reduce this revenue growth rate for years 
3-5 if the ﬁrm’s historic three-year growth rate is 
less than the forecast rate. Real growth continues 
over the next ﬁve years and beyond at a rate that 
calibrates the model value to the actual market value 
(see Appendix for full valuation-model procedure).   
This approach is analogous to pro forma procedures 
used in Claus and Thomas (2001) in which return 
on equity is modeled in order to estimate the cost 
of equity capital. 
Calibrated pro forma models yield weighted-
average estimates of expected ROI  [E(ROI)] and 
growth for the future life of the ﬁrm. Calculation 
  1 U.S. headquarters serves our purpose of consistent 
performance measurement and comparability by studying 
ﬁrms under generally accepted accounting principles required 
of U.S.-traded ﬁrms. U.S. headquarters are required for ﬁrms 
to be added to S&P U.S. indexes. This was not always a 
requirement; to minimize index turnover, pre-existing foreign 
ﬁrms are not removed on that basis (Standard and Poor’s 2001). 
In our sample, we exclude from our sample the only foreign 
(Dutch) company that was in the S&P packaged food industry, 
Unilever N.V.
  2 Inclusion of Supervalu is consistent with increasing 
internalization of distribution among the largest retailers, 
Albertson’s, Kroger, and Safeway; the only other S&P 500 
food-distribution-industry firm, Sysco Corp., is in food 
service, not groceries. S&P Small-Cap 600 ﬁrms have the 
same float-liquidity and U.S.-headquarters requirements
as the S&P 500. Remaining S&P retail-food-industry 
firms are either not primarily in the grocery business or 
are specialized in natural foods or convenience stores.18   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
of E(ROI) allows for comparison tests of expected 
future performance of retailers relative to manu-
facturers. Annual weights are the product of each 
period’s beginning invested-capital amount and dis-
count factor (i.e., period s weight = Kis-1 / (1+ri)s). 
Weighted-average expected extra-normal return 
or expected average residual return on investment 
would be the weighted-average pro forma return 
on investment in excess of the cost of capital. Each 
ﬁrm’s pro forma model valuation yields correspond-
ing weighted-average measures of required ROI and 
revenue growth. We test differences between the 
two industries’ weighted-average expected return 
on investment and weighted-average expected 
growth rates.
Recent Performance
In order to understand their expected future perfor-
mance, we ﬁrst  examine the relative performance 
of food retailers and manufacturers since the early 
1990s, a period of organizational and technological 
change.  It also captures the period marked by the 
April 1993 bellwether, “Marlboro Friday,” when 
Philip Morris announced 25% price cuts on their 
premium-brand cigarettes, signaling  that the pricing 
power of high-margin branded consumer products 
was softening (Advertising Age 1994).  
The ﬁrm-level measures include 1993 through 
ﬁscal year 2002, which includes ﬁrm ﬁscal-year 
ends ranging from July 2002 to June 2003. The ROI 
variable shows no trend for either industry; Table 
1 shows the mean annual changes in ROI were 
-0.16% for retailers and 0.00% for manufacturers, 
both insigniﬁcant (p-values shown to indicate statis-
tical-signiﬁcance levels). In comparison, a t-test of 
the difference in the means indicates that the mean 
annual change in ROI is not signiﬁcantly different 
for retailers and manufacturers.
Large-retailer gross margins (sales revenues 
less product costs) have improved as a percentage 
of sales revenues. Retailers most frequently attri-
bute improving gross margins to their sales mix 
shifting toward more high-value products with 
higher margins, which improves overall reported 
gross margins (SEC; Murray 2000; Fagnani 2000). 
Some of the large retailers—Albertson’s, Kroger, 
Safeway—attribute gross-margin improvements to 
increased private-label sales (SEC). Private-label 
goods have increased their share of the grocery-
store market from 14.9% in 1993 to 16.3% in 2002 
(PLMA 2003) as a proportion of total food-store 
industry sales (USDA 2002). The increase in retailer 
private-label sales is considered economically sig-
niﬁcant as a long-term force that could shift rents 
downstream from branded food-products manufac-
turers towards retailers. 
However, while retailer profit margins as a 
percentage of sales improved, overall ROI did not 
improve, in part due to increases in operating ex-
penses and increases in proportionate use of invest-
ed capital. The retailers’ improved higher-margin 
sales mix has required commensurate remodeling 
and improvements to stores to support higher pro-
portions of value-added products and services such 
as prepared foods, take-out foods, pharmacies, and 
ﬂorists (SEC). Retailers have upgraded the shopping 
experience and product mixes that usually require 
greater operating expenses for marketing, and 
greater tangible investments. Invested capital per 
dollar of sales increased, increasing the denominator 
of ROI and putting downward pressure on ROI. 
Over the 1993–2002 period, food manufacturer 
gross margins have also increased. Although im-
proved buying practices by large retailers may have 
been expected to pressure manufacturer-suppliers, 
many manufacturers also report improved sales 
mixes toward higher-margin products (SEC). Manu-
facturers have also beneﬁted from improved work-
force design and efﬁciently employed fewer people 
(Morris 2000).  Productivity in food manufacturing 
has also made steady gains (USDA 2002). These 
Table 1. Historical Performance: Mean Annual Changes, 1993–2002.
 Measures Retail Mfg Difference
ROI -0.16% 0.00% -0.16%
t Statistic -0.34 -0.01 -0.27
p-value (two-tail) 0.74 0.99 0.79
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operating improvements have contributed efﬁciency 
gains and allowed manufacturers to maintain ROI 
levels despite demands for capital investment.
We find little evidence to conclude that the 
ﬁnancial performance of large food retailers has 
improved with respect to the ﬁnancial performance 
of manufacturer-suppliers over the study period. It 
is possible that recent consolidation among large 
retailers has not yet produced the potential procure-
ment power expected. As large retailers consolidate 
and integrate their disparate and geographically 
separated operations they may develop more ef-
fective organizational synergies and efﬁciencies. 
Valuation levels of the ﬁrms offer evidence of 
whether large-retailer efﬁciency and performance 
are expected to improve in the future relative to 
large manufacturers.
Expected Change
Given that the full impact of many industry changes 
are not yet reﬂected in performance, we now evalu-
ate expected future changes in performance of food 
retailers and manufacturers. While retailers have not 
realized improved performance through the consoli-
dation trend of the 1990s, yet the long-term concern 
is whether retailers’ investments and changed indus-
try structure will lead to greater future performance, 
relative to historical performance and to the perfor-
mance of food manufacturers. Table 2 shows the 
mean expected future ROI and growth rates based 
on the pro forma models at two recent valuation 
dates: 15 August 2003 (Panel A), and 31 December 
2002 (panel B). These two valuation dates are exam-
ined to assess the stability of results P(calendar year 
Table 2. Valuation: Expected Weighted Average ROI [E(ROI)] in Excess of Historical ROI 
[His(ROI)], and Expected Growth Gates at Two Valuation Dates.
A. Valuation measure at 8/15/03 Retail Mfg Difference
mean E(ROI) 12.22% 28.70% NA
mean Hist(ROI)  (7 yrs.) 13.02% 31.21% NA
 
E(ROI)-Hist(ROI) mean -0.80% -2.51% 1.71%
t Statistic -0.70 -2.00 1.02
p-value (two-tail) 0.51 0.07 0.33
 
E(growth rate) mean 2.37% 4.24% -1.88%
t Statistic 5.05 15.20 -3.44
p-value (two-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.01
B. Valuation measure at 12/31/02 Retail Mfg Difference
mean E(ROI) 12.22% 27.83% NA
mean Hist(ROI)  (7 yrs.) 14.55% 28.87% NA
 
E(ROI)-Hist(ROI) mean -2.33% -1.04% -1.29%
t Statistic -1.37 -1.24 -0.68
p-value (two-tail) 0.23 0.24 0.52
 
E(growth rate) mean 2.26% 4.11% -1.85%
t Statistic 5.97 16.80 -4.11
p-value (two-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: p-value is the minimum two-tail signiﬁcance level at which hypothesized zero-value can be rejected.20   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
2002 year-end and subsequent date). The ﬁrst line 
of each panel shows the large-ﬁrm mean expected 
future ROI for each industry, “mean E(ROI).” The 
second line of each panel shows the mean histori-
cal ROI, “mean Hist(ROI),” for each industry over 
the preceding seven-year interval from the respec-
tive valuation dates. Overall ROI levels are higher 
for food manufacturing. An oft-cited reason is the 
earning power of manufacturer brand names and 
product differentiation, intangible assets with real 
earning power,3 but, the concern here is how relative 
performance is changing over time.
 “E(ROI)-Hist(ROI) mean” in each panel 
shows for each industry the difference of the mean 
expected future ROI in excess of the mean his-
torical ROI. Panel A shows at 15 August 2003 an 
insigniﬁcant expected decline of 0.80% for large 
retailers expected future ROI relative to their mean 
historical ROI (p-value indicates t-statistic of -0.70 
would be signiﬁcant at only the 51% level). For 
large manufacturers there is an expected decline of 
2.51% in expected ROI relative to historical ROI, 
signiﬁcant at the 7% level. The difference in the 
mean expected ROI change, -0.80% for retailers 
less -2.51% for manufacturers, is 1.71%. The dif-
ference is not signiﬁcant (it is signiﬁcant at only 
the 33% level). Thus market valuations do not offer 
evidence that expected future ROI for manufactur-
ers will decline signiﬁcantly more than for retailers 
(i.e., no evidence that retailers will improve relative 
to manufactures).
Expected future ROI is only part of the value 
picture, since expected growth also contributes to 
ﬁrm value. The second part of each panel of Table 2 
shows tests of the differences in the mean expected 
annual growth rates implicit in the valuation analy-
ses of the large ﬁrms from each industry. As of 15 
August 2003 the mean expected growth for the large 
retail ﬁrms is 2.37%; for the large manufacturers it is 
4.24%. The expected future annual growth rates for 
the retailers is 1.88% less than for manufacturers; 
this difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. 
Thus the 15 August 2003 evidence is that retailer 
ROI is expected to drop less than manufacturer ROI 
by a statistically insigniﬁcant difference of 1.71%. 
Furthermore, expected future growth rates for the 
retailers are a statistically signiﬁcant 1.88% less 
than for manufacturers. In sum, there is no evidence 
as of August 2003 that retailers are expected to im-
prove performance relative to manufacturers. 
To assess the stability of these results, the same 
tests are performed at the 31 December 2002 valu-
ation date; the results are shown in panel B of Table 
2. Again, the expected change in ROI performance 
is not signiﬁcantly different. Retailer ROI is actually 
estimated to decline 1.29% more than manufacturer 
ROI (52% signiﬁcance level). Also, retailer expect-
ed growth is again lower than for manufacturers 
(1.85% lower; signiﬁcance at less-than-1% level). 
Based on market-value evidence that neither retail 
ROI performance nor growth are expected to gain 
relative to manufacturers, we conclude that based 
on capital-market valuations, average large-retail 
ﬁrm performance is not expected to gain on the 
performance of large manufacturers.   
Conclusion
This study examines whether large food-retailer 
performance has gained relative to large food-manu-
facturer performance. This question emanated from 
the early 1990s when increasing retailer concen-
tration and perceived weakening of manufacturer 
brand names led many to hypothesize that retailers 
would gain on manufacturers. The evidence is that, 
ﬁrst, the historical mean annual change in return on 
investment has been insigniﬁcant for both retailers 
and manufacturers since the early 1990s. Second, 
the hypothesis that relative performance improve for 
retailers in the future is rejected by tests indicating 
that expected changes in retail return on investment 
and expected future growth do not exceed those 
of manufacturers. We based these tests on market 
expectations derived from market valuations of the 
ﬁrms. Thus even if large retailers gain efﬁciencies 
and market power over manufacturer-suppliers, this 
value may well not be captured as higher or faster 
growing proﬁts but instead passed on to consumers 
because of competition among retailers. 
  3 High manufacturer ROI can be partly attributed to 
accounting principles whereby advertising and research and 
development are accounted for as current-year expenses. 
Advertising and research expenditures are really long-term 
investments in product and brand-name development but are 
not capitalized as invested capital; not treating them as invested 
capital tends to understate invested capital and overstate ROI, 
more so for packaged-food manufacturers that have heavier 
advertising and research. (This accounting artifact is a reason 
that prior research has found a positive relations between 
advertising and ROI) (Fisher and McGowan 1983; Jacobson 
1987). Annual changes in return on investment evaluated in 
this study are less affected by accounting differences than are 
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Although store innovations may add new value 
to products and services, our analysis shows that 
product substitutions and competitive pressures 
may preclude retailers from earning signiﬁcantly 
higher returns. We may be encountering here a 
fundamental economic proposition that over time 
extra-normal returns induce ﬁrm entry that pres-
sures returns toward competitive levels (Fama and 
French 2000a). This is consistent with the drop in 
retail food equity values near the end of 2001 when 
Kroger led other major retailers in announcing that it 
would aggressively maintain market share through 
competitive pricing (Waters 2001). Recent com-
petitive pressures from Wal-Mart and other price-
oriented retailers, coupled with slackened demand 
arising from less-than-buoyant conditions in the 
general economy,  have  contributed to depressed 
retailer valuations in 2002. 
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Appendix: Valuation Model Calibration to Market Value
The pro forma model forecasts residual income over 
three future intervals: Initial interval over years 1–5, 
a transition period over years 6–10, and a continu-
ing steady-state from year 11 through perpetuity. 
Value is the sum of the beginning invested capital 
and present value of expected residual income (de-
ﬁned in Equation 1b). The model parameters which 
determine overall expected average ROI, growth 
rates, and resulting operating and investing cash 
ﬂows are estimated as follows:
1.  Growth, git (t = 1–5). Securities analysts’ 
consensus forecast growth estimates tend to be bi-
ased upward—more so for earnings than for sales 
and more so ﬁve years out than two years out (Chan, 
Karceski, and Lakonishok 2003). To attenuate this 
bias while using widely disseminated market in-
formation, we use consensus estimates of sales 
growth for only the ﬁrst and second year (Thom-
son Financial Network 2001–02). We then estimate 
sales growth for Years 3-5 as gi,3–5 = minimum of 
(i) gi,2 (Year-2 growth rate) or (ii) average of gi2 and 
the greater of (a) the 5-year U.S. Treasury bond 
yield or (b) the historical 3-year average growth 
rate (adjusted to remove the effect of acquisitions 
and reﬂect only organic growth). The effect of 
this formula is to continue the sales growth rate Bjornson and Kaufman Change and Firm Valuation in U.S. Food Retailing and Manufacturing  23
for years 3–5 (gi,3–5) at the second-year consensus 
growth rate gi,2 while keeping gi,3–5 equal to or less 
than the average of gi,2 and the greater of either the 
ﬁrm’s demonstrated 3-year historical growth rate 
or the Treasury bond yield, which approximates 
expected overall nominal economic growth (ex-
pected inﬂation plus a real return that corresponds 
to expected real economic growth); this limitation 
serves to dampen excessively optimistic consensus 
growth forecasts.
Example: At the 15 August 2003 valuation date, 
securities analysts’ consensus forecast growth esti-
mates of sales for each of the next two years for the 
ﬁrst of the six retailers, Albertson’s, were $35,900 
million and $36,700 million, respectively. This 
results in a ﬁrst-year growth rate (gi,1) of 0.77% 
and a second-year growth rate (gi,2) of  2.23%. 
This second-year growth rate was also forecast for 
the next three years (gi,3-5 = 2.23%) because it less 
than the maximum of the adjusted historic average 
growth rate (-1.5%, which reﬂects divestitures and 
adjusts out the effect of a large acquisition three 
years before that had doubled the ﬁrm’s size) and 
the 5-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (3.42%—bind-
ing maximum).
2.  ROIit (t = 1–5): ROI in the ﬁrst two pro 
forma years (t = 1–2) is set to equal ROI realized in 
the last historical year for a seamless transition from 
historical to pro forma performance. A residual-in-
come model requires only a speciﬁcation of ROI, 
but the inherent costs, expenses, and asset utiliza-
tion would occur as follows in an detailed valuation 
model. Pro forma expenses and asset balances for 
calculating ROI are ultimately a function of sales 
(Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 2000, p. 240–241). 
Costs and operating expenses and beginning net 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) and other as-
set balances are calculated as a percentage of sales; 
depreciation expense is a percentage of beginning 
gross PPE (average life); schedule of PPE is main-
tained with historical relationships of accumulated 
depreciation to depreciation expense (average age). 
Income-tax expense is calculated by multiplying the 
resulting earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
by the historical seven-year average tax expense 
percentage of EBIT. After deducting taxes, the re-
sulting net operating proﬁt is divided by the result-
ing beginning asset balance to yield ROI.
In the ﬁrst pro forma year, beginning asset bal-
ances are already ﬁxed as the realized ending bal-
ances from the last historical year which may alter 
the asset balance from its prior-year percentage of 
sales; if so, the cost and operating-expense percent-
age (of sales) is adjusted slightly to calibrate ﬁrst-
year ROI to equal ROI realized in the last historical 
year. With changing growth rates over time, depre-
ciation expense from the PPE schedule can cause 
slight variations in depreciation as a percentage of 
sales. For this reason, in the second year we adjust 
the cost-expense and asset-balance percentages of 
sales (in proportion to their respective seven-year 
historical standard errors, even though the allocation 
is irrelevant to the resulting ROI) to calibrate ROI 
to the same level as Year 1. ROI for Years 3–5 then 
depend on the constant percentages from Year 2.
Example continuation: Albertson’s in its last 
ﬁscal year had ROIi = 10.5%. This reﬂects costs 
and expenses of 92.30% of sales, depreciation of 
2.71% of sales, and taxes of 36.9% of EBIT or 
1.56% of sales. After deducting these expenses 
there is a net operating proﬁt of 3.43% of sales. 
Assets were 32.6% of sales. Dividing the proﬁt 
margin by the asset percentage (3.43% / 32.6%) 
yields an ROI of 10.5%. In the ﬁrst pro forma year 
the beginning asset balance (from the prior-year 
ending balance) in conjunction with the ﬁrst-year 
pro forma sales results in a pro forma asset per-
centage of 31.5%. The depreciation percentage 
remains at 2.71%. The cost-expense percentage is 
adjusted to 92.03%, which results in taxes of 1.94% 
of sales (36.9% of EBIT) and a net operating proﬁt 
margin of 3.32% of sales; ROIi,1 = (3.32% / 31.5%) 
= 10.5%. In the second year, increased consensus 
sales-growth forecasts and stable cost-expense and 
asset percentages and depreciation of 2.69% of sales 
would result in an ROI of 10.6%. The cost-expense 
percentage is adjusted to 92.07%, which results in 
taxes of 1.93% of sales (36.9% of EBIT) and a net 
operating proﬁt margin of 3.31% of sales; the as-
set balance is adjusted to 31.4% of sales; ROIi,2 = 
(3.31% / 31.4%) = 10.5%. By Year 5, depreciation 
expense falls slightly to 2.68% (before later rising 
back to 2.69%), and ROIi,5 = 10.6%.
3.  ROIit (t ≥ 6). Adjust ROI for the continuing 
period (t ≥ 11) so that the pro forma model’s present 
value of residual-income cash ﬂows equals actual 
market value, solved with Excel’s “Solver” program 
subject to constraints that the continuing growth rate 
equals the expected inﬂation rate, and the continu-
ing ROI is less than or equal to the posterior estimate 
of ROI equal to the average of the ROI realized in 
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seven-year historical average ROI. Transition-pe-
riod ROI levels (t = 6–10) adjust linearly from the 
end of initial period (t = 5) to the beginning of the 
continuing steady-state period from t = 11 (the tax 
rate transitions linearly from the historical rate to a 
statutory rate of 35% while cost-expense and asset 
percentages transition to bring ROI to the long-term 
posterior estimate). The transition growth rate (t = 
6–10) is adjusted from the expected inﬂation rate 
(estimated from the U.S. Treasury bond yield curve) 
to calibrate to market value, but the correspond-
ing real growth rate is limited to a maximum of 
the Year-5 level. If the continuing long-term ROI 
constraint (posterior ROI estimate) is binding so 
that pro forma value is still less than actual market 
value, continuing long-term growth rate, gt (t ≥ 11), 
is calibrated so that pro forma value equals market 
value (corresponding real growth rate limited to a 
maximum of the Year-10 level; if pro forma value 
is still below market value, gt for t ≥ 6 are increased 
by the same increment until pro forma value equals 
market value). The market value of a ﬁrm equals the 
market value of its equity (share price multiplied by 
number of shares outstanding) plus the accounting 
book value of its debt and preferred stock (with a 
market-value adjustment cited in the footnotes of 
the ﬁnancial statements and rolled forward from 
the ﬁnancial-statement date to the valuation date to 
account for income received and new investments 
made) which closely approximates market value. 
(The use of book value follows Fama and French 
[1999], Megna and Klock [1993], and others.)
Example continuation: Albertson’s historic 
seven-year average ROI was 10.5%, the same as 
the ROI realized in the last historical year, so the 
posterior ROI is 10.5%. From Year 5 to Year 11, 
cost-expense percentage is adjusted linearly to 
92.20%, which results in taxes of 1.79% of sales 
(35.0% of EBIT) and a net operating proﬁt margin 
of 3.32% of sales; the asset balance transitions to 
31.5% of sales; ROIi,2 = (3.32% / 31.5%) = 10.5%. 
This results in a pro forma valuation that is below 
the market valuation of $13,657 million ($7,532 
million of equity plus debt of $6,125 million), so 
the growth rate for t = 6–10 is increased to 2.69% 
(resulting in the maximum real growth of 0.31% 
from Year 5), resulting in a pro forma value still 
below market value. Finally, the long term growth 
rate for t ≥ 11 was increased to 2.50%, at which 
the pro forma value is equal to the market value of 
$13,657 million. The pro forma models shows a 
weighted average ROI = 10.53% and a weighted-
average annual growth rate of 2.45%.
4.  Expected ROI implicit in residual income 
and the measured historical ROI to which it is 
compared do not account for asset write-offs and 
some expenses that bypass the income statement 
(even though these investments and expenses con-
sume cash) nor for the expected dilution cost of 
outstanding stock options. Accordingly, a valuation 
allowance is made for the effects of (i) outstand-
ing employee stock options and dilutive securities, 
and (ii) average periodic “dirty surplus” income 
accounting whereby write-offs and expenses that 
reduce asset values but are not reﬂected in reported 
income (Penman 2001, pp. 238–248). The valuation 
allowance is a deduction from the pro forma value 
and thus results in a higher pro forma ROI and re-
sidual income required to calibrate to market value, 
consistent with the overstatement of historical ROI 
which also did not include these expenses and to 
which pro forma ROI is compared. Historical returns 
are analyzed to incorporate clean surplus accounting 
(Feltham and Ohlson 1995), whereby changes in a 
ﬁrm’s accounting-capital balances must equal income 
less dividends and ﬁrm securities transactions. This 
accounts for all income-related items, including those 
that have by-passed income statements (inconspicu-
ously), and asset write-offs that are sometimes er-
roneously ignored by analysts as “one-time” or 
“non-recurring” events. Clean surplus accounting 
allows valuation adjustments for inferences about 
expected future ROI in forward-looking valuation 
models (Penman 2001, pp. 654-656). These losses 
for the historic seven-year period are calculated 
as an average loss on assets and are assumed to 
continue in perpetuity but not grow. Stock-option-
dilution percentage of equity is calculated from 
footnote information on dilution and on the number 
of employee stock options, average exercise price 
and maturity.
Example continuation: Albertson’s clean surplus 
losses averaged 3.48% of assets over the past seven 
years (relatively large revaluations and write-offs 
resulted after large acquisitions). Annual losses 
were calculated at $480 million = 3.48% × $13,805-
million ending historical total asset balance; in per-
petuity this is negatively valued at $6,734 million. 
Stock-option dilution was calculated at 0.54% (2 
million shares dilution divided by 372 million 
shares outstanding), resulting in a negative equity 
valuation allowance of $41million (0.54% × $7,532 Bjornson and Kaufman Change and Firm Valuation in U.S. Food Retailing and Manufacturing  25
million equity). The total valuation allowance of 
$6,774 million is a negative amount subtracted from 
required residual income value to arrive at the total 
net pro forma valuation of $13,657 million.
5.  Discount rate is estimated as the weighted 
average cost of capital, ri = [(D/(D+E))i × rid  × (1−τ 
)]  +  (E/(D+E))i × [rf  + (rm − rf)⋅βi ], where D is 
market value of ﬁrm debt estimated from the ﬁrm’s 
published ﬁnancial statement accounting book value 
(Fama and French 1999) plus any adjustment to 
fair market value as disclosed in ﬁnancial statement 
footnotes, E is ﬁrm equity market value calculated 
from shares outstanding multiplied by share market 
price, rid is the ﬁrm’s cost of debt capital (estimated 
from ﬁnancial statement disclosures and Moody’s 
debt ratings [2002]), τ is the marginal corporate 
tax rate used to calculate the ﬁrm’s after-tax cost 
of debt capital (we follow Copeland, Koller, and 
Murrin [2000, p. 253] and use τ = 35%), (rm − rf) is 
the market risk premium where rf is risk-free rate of 
return and rm is expected return on market portfolio 
(we follow Claus and Thomas [2001] and Cope-
land, Koller, and Murrin [2000] and use ten-year 
U.S. Treasury bond yield as rf), and βi is ﬁrm’s beta 
sensitivity to market risk premium under capital as-
set pricing model (Sharpe 1964). Empirical tests of 
asset-pricing models to estimate beta and the market 
risk premium have low power, and there is not a 
dominant approach to estimating cost of capital. 
Part of the reason for this is that expected market 
risk premium (rm − rf) and ﬁrm beta (βi) are ex-ante 
concepts that must be estimated from historical data 
with a measurement error; measurement error for 
betas of individual ﬁrms or industry-group portfo-
lios of ﬁrms is particularly high (Fama and French 
1997). Thus we assume the market risk premium 
(rm − rf) is 4%, following Fama and French (2000a), 
who also use an ex-ante approach to estimation; 
and we assume a market-wide average beta of 1 
for each ﬁrm on the basis that estimated betas have 
large measurement errors, even at the industry level 
(Fama and French 1997).
To estimate ri for each ﬁrm we ﬁrst develop 
an average cost-of-capital discount rate for aver-
age corporate business risk, ra, assuming average 
corporate leverage D/(D+E) = 20%;  and average 
cost of debt capital rd = yield on average corporate 
bond with Moody’s Baa rating (U.S. Federal Re-
serve Board 2001-2002): ra = [20% × rd × (1−.35)] + 
[80% × (rf + 4%)]. We then estimate each ﬁrm’s cost 
of equity capital, rie = ra + [(ra − rd) × (D/E)i ]; this 
adjusts the cost of equity capital for ﬁrm leverage 
(D/E)i consistent with theory and practice (Brealy 
and Myers 2000, p. 483). The ﬁrm’s estimated cost 
of capital is then ri = [(D/(D+E))i × rid  × (1−τ )] + 
[(E/(D+E))i × rie]. 
Example completion: For the 15 August 2003 
valuation date, the average cost of capital  ra = 
[20% × rd × (1−.35)] + [80% × (rf + 4%)] = [20% × 
7.14% × 0.65] + [80% × (4.55% + 4%)] = 8.27%. 
Albertson’s debt was rated at Baa1; rid = 7.14%. 
Albertson’s cost of equity capital was rie = ra + [(ra 
− rd) × (D/E)i ] =  8.27% + [(8.27% − 7.14%) × 
0.813 ] = 9.19%. Thus Albertson’s estimated cost 
of capital is ri = [(D/(D+E))i × rid  × (1−τ )] + [(E/
(D+E))i × rie] = [0.448 × 7.14% × 0.65] + [0.552 × 
9.19%] = 7.15%.